Bargaining with Deadlines and Private Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.219
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 219-243
• 关键词: Monopoly

摘要

We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear deadline effect. That is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade, and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place on the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect the overall efficiency of the equilibrium nonmonotonically. For intermediate deadlines, efficiency is improved if agents face bleaker prospects after deadline.