-
作者：Barbosa, K. L. E. N. I. O.; De Silva, Dakshina g.; Yang, L. I. Y. U.; Yoshimoto, H. I. S. A. Y. U. K. I.
作者单位：Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; Lancaster University; Nanjing Audit University; University of Glasgow
摘要：This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically differen...
-
作者：LIu, Bin; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; National University of Singapore
摘要：Due to the well-known efficiency-rent extraction trade-off, the optimal mechanism in a pure screening environment (e.g., rev-enue maximization in auctions or cost minimization in procure-ment) typically calls for distortions in allocative efficiency when agents possess private information at the time of contracting. In this paper we introduce first-stage type-enhancing hidden invest-ment to a standard sequential screening model of procurement, and find that (i) with convex investment cost, mit...
-
作者：Acemoglu, Daron; Makhdoumi, Ali; Malekian, Azarakhsh; Ozdaglar, Asu
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Duke University; University of Toronto; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals infor-mation about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sha...
-
作者：Akin, S. Nuray; Platt, Brennan C.
作者单位：Ozyegin University; Brigham Young University
摘要：We study a dynamic equilibrium search model where sellers differ in their urgency to liquidate an asset. Buyers strategically make price offers without knowing a given seller's urgency. We study liquidity and price dynamics on the transition path after an unex-pected shock. Generically, the transition includes a phase where all buyers offer the same price, causing a market collapse; how-ever, price dispersion resumes in finite time, leading to a recovery where both types make sales. We show th...
-
作者：Levit, Doron; Tsoy, Anton
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Toronto; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is pri-vately informed about agents' payoffs from the policy and his conflict of interest. We show that one-size-fits-all recommendations can be informative even when payoffs are independent across agents. Such recommendations increase the expert's i...
-
作者：Xiao, Mo; Yuan, Zhe
作者单位：University of Arizona; Zhejiang University; Zhejiang University
摘要：US spectrum licenses cover geographically distinct areas and often complement each other. A bidder seeking to acquire multiple licenses is exposed to the risk of winning only isolatedpatches. Using Auction 73 data, we model the bidding process as an entry game with inter-dependent markets and evolving bidder beliefs. Bidders' decisions on bidding provide bounds on licenses' stand-alone values and com-plementarity between licenses. We show that the effects of package bidding on bidders' exposur...
-
作者：Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：University of Toronto; Brandeis University
摘要：We model the reporting of sexual misconduct. Individuals underreport misconduct due to strategic uncertainty over whether others will report and corroborate a pattern of behavior. Underreporting occurs if and only if misconduct is widespread. Making sanctions more responsive to reports, raising public awareness of misconduct, implementing con-fidential holding tanks, and appropriately calibrating damage awards can encourage reporting. However, we also show when such policies are ineffective or...
-
作者：Dessein, Wouter; Lo, Desmond (Ho-Fu); Minami, Chieko
作者单位：Columbia University; Santa Clara University; Kobe University
摘要：We explore the relationship between the volatility of a firm's local environment and its organizational structure. Using micro-level data on managers working for a large retailer, we empirically test and provide support for our theory that a more volatile local environment results in more decentralization only when the need for coordination among subunits is low. In contrast, more local volatility is associated with more centralization when coordination needs are high. Our evi-dence supports t...
-
作者：Dreyfuss, Bnaya; Heffetz, Ori; Rabin, Matthew
作者单位：Harvard University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University
摘要：Deferred acceptance (DA), a widely implemented algorithm, is meant to improve allocations: under classical preferences, it induces preference-concordant rankings. However, recent evidence shows that-in both real, large-stakes applications and experiments -par-ticipants frequently play seemingly dominated, significantly costly strategies that avoid small chances of good outcomes. We show the-oretically why, with expectations-based loss aversion, this behavior may be partly intentional. Reanalyz...
-
作者：Kim, Jeongbin; Palfrey, Thomas R.; Zeidel, Jeffrey R.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We develop a general framework for analyzing games where each player is a team and members of the same team all receive the same payoff. The framework combines noncooperative game theory with collective choice theory, and is developed for both strategic form and extensive form games. We introduce the concept of team equilibrium and identify conditions under which it converges to Nash equilibrium with large teams. We identify conditions on collective choice rules such that team decisions are st...
