License Complementarity and Package Bidding: US Spectrum Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xiao, Mo; Yuan, Zhe
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; Zhejiang University; Zhejiang University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210091
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 420-464
• 关键词: models; estimators; inference; synergies

摘要

US spectrum licenses cover geographically distinct areas and often complement each other. A bidder seeking to acquire multiple licenses is exposed to the risk of winning only isolatedpatches. Using Auction 73 data, we model the bidding process as an entry game with inter-dependent markets and evolving bidder beliefs. Bidders' decisions on bidding provide bounds on licenses' stand-alone values and com-plementarity between licenses. We show that the effects of package bidding on bidders' exposure risks depend on package format and size. More importantly, package bidding increases auction revenue substantially at the cost of reducing bidder surplus and increasing license allocation concentration. (JEL D44, H82, L96)