A Theory of One-Size-Fits-All Recommendations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levit, Doron; Tsoy, Anton
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; European Corporate Governance Institute; University of Toronto; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200138
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 318-347
• 关键词: cheap-talk; world-bank; Mutual funds; persuasion; mechanism; IMF

摘要

One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is pri-vately informed about agents' payoffs from the policy and his conflict of interest. We show that one-size-fits-all recommendations can be informative even when payoffs are independent across agents. Such recommendations increase the expert's influence by concealing his conflict of interest. We apply the model to recommendations provided by the IMF, World Bank, proxy advisory firms, central banks, and the Basel Committee. (JEL D82, E58, F33, F53, G28, G34)