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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：We consider a two-stage contest, in which only a subset of contestants enters the finale. We explore the optimal policy for disclosing con-testants' interim status after the preliminary round, i.e., their interim ranking and elimination decision. The optimum depends on the design objective. We fully characterize the conditions under which disclo-sure or concealment emerges as the optimum. We further allow the organizer to bias the competition based on finalists' interim rankings, which endogen...
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作者：Gradwohl, Ronen; Hahn, Niklas; Hoefer, Martin; Smorodinsky, Rann
作者单位：Ariel University; Goethe University Frankfurt; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper, we study a setting with multiple senders in which the receiver is restricted to choosing, at the interim stage, one sender with whom to interact. Our main result is that whenever senders are uncertain about each other's prefer-ences and, in particular, cannot d...
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作者：Yamashita, Takuro; Zhu, Shuguang
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about the agent's belief. Although ex post incentive-compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any knowledge about the agent's belief, we show that, under a certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists a non-EPIC mecha-nism that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than any EPIC mechanism given whatever (admissible) belief struc...
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作者：Bac, Mehmet
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：How should law enforcement resources be allocated to minimize the harms from flexible, chain-form trafficking organizations? I show that optimal interventions focus on one target, the feeding source (decap-itation) or the revenue-generating tail (amputation). Decapitation dismantles the crime chain under large budgets but induces maxi-mal expansion otherwise, whereas amputation generates a rich set of detection outcomes and limits the chain's size response. A rule of thumb emerges for authorit...
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作者：Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn
摘要：We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a left-right axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume that preferences are single peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting pro-cess, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophi...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Miller, David A.
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incen-tive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. A...
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作者：Bezin, Emeline; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Monash University
摘要：We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in which both the family structure and the decision to commit crime are endog-enous and the dynamics of moral norms of good conduct is trans-mitted intergenerationally by families and peers. By destroying biparental families and putting fathers in prison, we show that more intense crime repression can backfire because it increases the possi-bility that criminals' sons become criminals themselves. Our model also explains the emergence and pe...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Lehrer, Euud
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper studies the impact of noisy signals on screening pro-cesses. It deals with a decision problem in which a decision-maker screens a set of elements based on noisy unbiased evaluations. Given that the decision-maker uses threshold strategies, we show that addi-tional binary noise can potentially improve a screening, an effect that resembles a lucky coin toss. We compare different noisy sig-nals under threshold strategies and optimal ones, and we provide several characterizations of ca...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：A monopolistic firm observes a signal about the state of the world and then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to an uninformed consumer who has recourse to some outside option. We provide a geometric characterization of the firm's information structure that maximizes the consumer's surplus: the optimal regime partitions the space of payoff states into polyhedral cones with disjoint interiors. We inter-pret our results in terms of the maximization of the consumer's pri-vacy rent. We illustrate ...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Vivek; Howard, Greg
作者单位：Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：This paper provides evidence of rational inattention by experienced professionals in strategic interactions. We add rational inattention to a game of matching pennies with state-dependent payoffs. Unlike the full-information, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, payoffs of different actions need not be equated state by state. Moreover, players respond partially to payoff differences, this responsiveness is stronger when attention costs are lower, strategies converge to full-information Nash as sta...
