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作者：Ghidoni, Riccardo; Suetens, Sigrid
作者单位：University of Bologna; Tilburg University
摘要：Sequentiality of moves in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma does not change the conditions under which mutual cooperation can be supported in equilibrium relative to simultaneous decision-making. The nature of the interaction is different, however, given that sequen-tial play reduces strategic uncertainty. We show in an experiment that this has large consequences for behavior. We find that with inter-mediate incentives to cooperate, sequentiality increases the cooper-ation rate by arou...
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作者：Martinelli, Cesar
作者单位：George Mason University
摘要：We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment in which politicians may take bribes at different stages of their careers and in which politicians'actions are only imper-fectly observed by voters. We show that the expectation of promotion to higher office may motivate some politicians to behave worse at the latest stages of their careers, setting off a trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior at lower levels of office and selecting better ...
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作者：Anesi, Vincent; Buisseret, Peter
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Harvard University
摘要：We study the limits of dynamic electoral accountability when voters are uncertain about politicians' characteristics (adverse selection) and their actions (moral hazard). Existing work argues that voters cannot achieve their first-best payoff. This is attributed to inherent deficiencies of the electoral contract, including voters' inability to precommit, and the restriction to a binary retention-replacement decision. We provide conditions under which voters can, despite these constraints, obta...
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作者：Che, Xiaogang; LI, Tong; Lu, Jingfeng; Zheng, Xiaoyong
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; Vanderbilt University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We examine optimal auction design when buyers may receive future outside offers. The winning bidder may choose to default upon observing her outside offer. Under the optimal mechanism, the bidder with the highest value wins if and only if her value is above a cutoff, and the winner never defaults. The optimal auction takes the form of a second-price auction with a reserve price and a deposit by the winning bidder. Under regularity conditions, both the optimal reserve price and the deposit incr...
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作者：Dogan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Bristol; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：In the context of priority-based allocation of objects , we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We intro-duce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that for any stability comparison satisfy-ing the three properties , the top trading cycles mechanism is mini-mally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying approach covers basically all natural stability c...
