Accountability and Grand Corruption br

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Martinelli, Cesar
• 署名单位: George Mason University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200186
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 645-679
• 关键词: Electoral accountability; audits; politicians; equilibrium; incentives

摘要

We propose a model of political careers and electoral accountability in an environment in which politicians may take bribes at different stages of their careers and in which politicians'actions are only imper-fectly observed by voters. We show that the expectation of promotion to higher office may motivate some politicians to behave worse at the latest stages of their careers, setting off a trade-off between providing incentives for good behavior at lower levels of office and selecting better politicians for higher office. Optimal rewards focus either on stamping out corruption at lower levels of office or on improving selec-tion for higher office. (JEL D72, D73, K42)