Optimal Nonlinear Pricing by a Dominant Firm under Competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chao, Yong; Tan, Guofu; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
• 署名单位: University of Louisville; University of Southern California; Lingnan University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190337
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 240-280
• 关键词: naked exclusion; common agency; revelation; CONTRACTS; monopoly

摘要

We consider a nonlinear pricing problem faced by a dominant firm competing with a minor firm. The dominant firm offers a general tariff first, and then the minor firm responds with a per-unit price, followed by a buyer choosing her purchases. By developing a mechanism-design approach to solve the subgame perfect equilibrium, we characterize the dominant firm's optimal nonlinear tariff, which exhibits convexity and yet can display quantity discounts. In equilibrium the dominant firm uses a continuum of unchosen offers to constrain its rival's potential deviations and extract more surplus from the buyer. Antitrust implications are also discussed.