Negotiations with Limited Specifiability

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fukuda, Satoshi; Kamada, Yuichiro
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190089
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 216-244
• 关键词: dynamic oligopoly; Perfect equilibria; folk theorem; COORDINATION; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION

摘要

We study negotiations with limited specifiability-each party may not be able to fully specify a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative statics on specifiability as well as move structures. We find that asynchronicity of proposal announcements narrows down the equilibrium payoff set, in particular, leading to a unique prediction in negotiations with a common interest alternative. The equilibrium payoff set is not a singleton in general, and depends on the fine details of how limitation on specifiability is imposed. The equilibrium payoff set is weakly larger under limited specifiability than under unlimited specifiability.