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作者：Antler, Yair; Bird, Daniel; Oliveros, Santiago
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; University of Bristol
摘要：We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fab-ricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project's quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strat-egies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabri-cated and a later s...
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作者：Chambolle, Claire; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers that supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. We further show that our theory holds when buyer power...
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作者：Fosgerau, Mogens; Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jorgen
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefully to screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria, and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receive different equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment...
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作者：Evans, Robert; Reiche, Sonje
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Yale University
摘要：We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. Optimality of an expert depends on char-acteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed or fine information can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F of the state, a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single peaked (bimodal). If only coarse informa-tion can be acquired, then a con...
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作者：Levin, Dan; Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We characterize the optimal misbehavior by bidding rings or an auc-tioneer in the ascending English auction with common values. We also show, in an extended game, that in equilibrium potential members join and truthfully reveal their signals. Under a separability assump-tion, behavior does not change if nonring bidders are informed about the ring's existence. In general, misbehavior in dynamic settings is more profitable than in outcome-equivalent static settings. However, under a stronger sep...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals infor-mation to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become pu...
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作者：Marinovic, Ivan; Szydlowsii, Martin
作者单位：Stanford University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study the disclosure policy of a regulator overseeing a monitor with reputation concerns. The monitor faces a manager, who chooses how much to manipulate based on the monitor's reputation. Reputational incentives are strongest for intermediate reputations. Instead of providing transparency, the regulator's disclosure policy aims to keep the monitor's reputation intermediate, even at the cost of diminished incentives. Beneficial schemes feature random delay or noisy information. Schemes that...
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作者：Hafner, Samuel; Taylor, Curtis R.
作者单位：University of St Gallen; Duke University
摘要：We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers' equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and...
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作者：Espinosa, Francisco; Ray, Debra
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：An agent who privately knows his type seeks to be retained by a principal. Agents signal their type with some ambient noise, but can alter this noise, perhaps at some cost. Our main finding is that in equilibrium, the principal treats extreme signals in either direction with suspicion, and retains the agent if and only if the signal falls in some intermediate bounded set. In short, she follows the maxim: if it seems too good to be true, it probably is. We consider exten-sions and applications,...
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作者：Ke, T. Tony; Li, Christopher; Safronov, Mikhail
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; Vanderbilt University; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper explores potential inefficiencies of incomplete contracts in a dynamic career concerns context. In a firm-worker relationship, the worker performs public tasks that have trade-offs between pro-ductivity and informativeness. We show that the first-best outcome can be obtained with short-term contracts if the wage can depend on the task choice. This provides an explanation for wage jumps at promotions-the worker is assigned the more productive but less informative task after promotion...
