When Is a Contrarian Adviser Optimal?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Evans, Robert; Reiche, Sonje
• 署名单位: University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge; Yale University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200204
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 434-466
• 关键词: information; disclosure; opinions

摘要

We compare contrarian to conformist advice, a contrarian expert being one whose preference bias is against the decision-maker's prior optimal decision. Optimality of an expert depends on char-acteristics of prior information and learning. If either the expert is fully informed or fine information can be acquired cheaply, then for symmetric distributions F of the state, a conformist (contrarian) is superior if F is single peaked (bimodal). If only coarse informa-tion can be acquired, then a contrarian acquires more on average and hence is superior. If information is verifiable, a contrarian has less incentive to hide unfavorable evidence and again is superior. (JEL D72, D82, D83, G34, H71, I12, L94)