Sequential Learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Antler, Yair; Bird, Daniel; Oliveros, Santiago
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; University of Bristol
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200352
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 399-433
• 关键词: optimal-contracts; experimentation; deadlines

摘要

We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fab-ricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project's quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strat-egies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabri-cated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, L15)