Optimal Nonlinear Pricing with Data-Sensitive Consumers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210190
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 80-108
• 关键词: online privacy; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We study monopolistic screening when some consumers are data sensitive and incur a privacy cost if their purchase reveals infor-mation to the monopolist. The monopolist discriminates between data-sensitive and classical consumers using privacy mechanisms that consist of a direct mechanism and a privacy option. A privacy mechanism is optimal for large privacy costs and leaves classical consumers better off than data-sensitive consumers with the same valuation. When privacy preferences become public information, data-sensitive consumers and the monopolist gain, whereas classi-cal consumers lose. Our results are relevant for policies targeting consumers' data awareness, such as the European General Data Protection Regulation. (JEL D11, D42, D82, D83, L12)