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作者：Ater, Itai; Rigbi, Oren
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：We study the effects of a price transparency regulation in Israeli supermarkets. Using price data collected before and after the regu-lation and a difference-in-difference research design, we show that price levels and price dispersion declined significantly after the reg-ulation. Chains also began setting identical prices in all stores. We use Robert and Stahl (1993) to interpret our findings, showing that low-priced chains extensively used price advertising after prices became transparent. T...
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作者：Bushong, Benjamin; Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan
作者单位：Michigan State University; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We document a form of attribution bias wherein people wrongly ascribe sensations of positive or negative surprise to the underly-ing disutility of a real-effort task. Participants in our experiments learned from experience about two unfamiliar tasks, one more onerous than the other. We manipulated expectations about which task they would face: some participants were assigned their task by chance, while others knew their assignment in advance. Hours later, we elicited willingness to work again ...
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作者：Budish, Eric; Bhave, Aditya
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Economists have long been puzzled by event-ticket underpricing: underpricing reduces revenue for the performer and encourages socially wasteful rent-seeking by ticket brokers. What about using an auction? This paper studies the introduction of auctions into this market by Ticketmaster in the mid-2000s. By combining primary-market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary-market resale value data from eBay, we show that Ticketmaster's auctions worked : they substantially improved price disc...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players' bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez- faire policy-i.e., no cap-is ...
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作者：Langtry, Alastair
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of London; King's College London
摘要：Keeping up with The Joneses matters. This paper examines a model of reference-dependent choice where reference points are determined by social comparisons. An increase in the strength of social comparisons, even by only a few agents, increases consumption and decreases welfare for everyone. Strikingly, a higher marginal cost of consumption can increase welfare. In a labor market, social comparisons with coworkers create a big fish in a small pond effect, inducing incomplete labor market sortin...
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作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Firms and politicians, among others, invest heavily to influence people's opinions. Because peers influence one another, these efforts must account for social networks. Using a model of opinion dynamics with a non-degenerate steady state, I develop a new measure of influence, and I highlight how opinion fluctuations impact influence campaigns. If agents interact less frequently with those holding different opinions, the variance of public opinion decreases. Consequently, a risk-averse planner ...
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作者：Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents' information structure, requires (i) indi-vidual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the p...
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作者：Argenziano, Rossella; Gilboa, Itzhak
作者单位：University of Essex; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A statistical game is a game in which strategic interaction is mediated via a binary outcome y, coupled with a prediction problem where a characteristic x of the gamx, y). In Similarity Nash Equilibria, players combine statistical and strategic reasoning, using an estimate of y as a coordination device. They predict y by its similarity-weighted frequency and learn the optimal notion of similarity from the data. We prove that the model captures the importance of precedents and the endogenous fo...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privat...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：University of Haifa; Reichman University
摘要：We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homogeneous soft information about their values before paying to acquire ratings. We find that for every accuracy level of the issuers' initial information, voluntary disclosure results in a more informative equilibrium than mandatory disclosure. Th...
