Misbehavior in Common Value Auctions: Bidding Rings and Shills

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levin, Dan; Peck, James
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200447
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 171-200
• 关键词: ascending prices; BEHAVIOR

摘要

We characterize the optimal misbehavior by bidding rings or an auc-tioneer in the ascending English auction with common values. We also show, in an extended game, that in equilibrium potential members join and truthfully reveal their signals. Under a separability assump-tion, behavior does not change if nonring bidders are informed about the ring's existence. In general, misbehavior in dynamic settings is more profitable than in outcome-equivalent static settings. However, under a stronger separability assumption, the ring can do no better in the dynamic English format than in the outcome-equivalent, static Sophi format.