A Buyer Power Theory of Exclusive Dealing and Exclusionary Bundling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chambolle, Claire; Molina, Hugo
• 署名单位: Universite Paris Saclay; AgroParisTech; INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210191
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 166-200
• 关键词: naked exclusion; vertical integration; Bargaining power; CONTRACTS; entry; leverage; barrier; equilibrium; breach

摘要

We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers that supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. We further show that our theory holds when buyer power differs across manufacturers or when the retailer can strategically narrow (or expand) its product assortment.