-
作者：Dressler, Luisa; Weiergraeber, Stefan
作者单位：Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We quantify how switching costs and limited awareness affect con-sumer inertia in liberalized retail electricity markets by developing and estimating a structural demand model using a novel dataset on electricity contract choices in Belgium. Our data allow us to dis-entangle different sources of inertia by using a rich combination of macromoments and micromoments. We find that consumers perceive contracts as differentiated and both limited awareness and switching costs hinder efficient choices...
-
作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit; Mettral, Thomas
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper studies a canonical dynamic screening problem where the agent has Markovian private information and limited commit-ment and the principal and the agent have different discount fac-tors. Unequal discounting captures unequal access to capital markets. In comparison to standard models of dynamic mecha-nism design, the principal no longer finds it optimal to maximally back-load the agent's information rents: a new force of inter -temporal cost of incentive provision pushes toward front ...
-
作者：Charness, Gary; Sontuoso, Alessandro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We investigate how strategic behavior is affected by the set of notions (frames) used when thinking about the game. In our games the action set consists of visual objects: each player must privately choose one, trying to match the counterpart's choice. We propose a model where different player-types are aware of different attributes of the action set (hence, different frames). One of the novelties is an epistemic structure that allows players to think about new frames, after initial unawarenes...
-
作者：Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：I study a dynamic model of consumer privacy and platform data collection. In each period consumers choose their level of platform activity. Greater activity generates more information about the con-sumer, thereby increasing platform profits. When the platform can commit to the future privacy policy, it collects information by com-mitting to gradually decreasing the level of privacy protection. In the long run consumers lose privacy and receive low payoffs but choose high activity levels. In co...
-
作者：Huangfu, Bingchao; Liu, Heng
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
摘要：This paper analyzes information spillover in a multi-good adverse selection model in which a privately informed seller trades two different goods in two different markets. Buyers learn the seller's information from both the market they participate in and the trading outcomes in the other market. We identify a sufficient negative correlation condition under which information spillover reduces efficiency loss. We also discover a novel type of coordination friction that leads to multiple equilibr...
-
作者：Hermalin, Benjamin E.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Charismatic leaders are often desired. At the same time, experience, especially with demagogues, as well as social science studies, raise doubts about such leaders. This paper offers explanations for char-ismatic leadership's mixed report card. It offers insights into why and when charismatic leadership can be effective; which, when, and why certain groups will prefer more to less charismatic leaders; and how being more charismatic can make leaders worse in other dimen-sions, particularly caus...
-
作者：Clithero, John A.; Lee, Jae Joon; Tasoff, Joshua
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Claremont Graduate University
摘要：The canonical direct-elicitation approach for measuring individuals' valuations for goods is the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak procedure , which generates willingness-to-pay (WTP) values that are imprecise and systematically biased. We show that enhancing elicited WTP values with supervised machine learning (SML) can improve estimates of peoples' out-of-sample purchase behavior. Furthermore , swapping WTP data with choice data generated from a simple task leads to comparable performance. We quantify...
-
作者：Petterson, Marco Stenborg; Seim, David; Shapiro, Jesse M.
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Uppsala University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the problem of learning about the effect of one market-level variable (e.g., price) on another (e.g., quantity) in the presence of shocks to unobservables (e.g., preferences). We show that economic intuitions about the plausible size of the shocks can be informative about the parameter of interest. We illustrate with a main application to the grain market. (JEL D83, E23, G13, Q11)
-
作者：Hauser, Daniel N.
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：I study how a firm manages its reputation by both investing in the quality of its product and censoring, hiding bad news from con -sumers. Without censorship, the threat of bad news provides strong incentives for investment. I highlight discontinuities in the firm's maximum equilibrium payoff that censorship creates. When censor-ship is inexpensive, the firm never invests and a patient firm's pay-offs approach the lowest possible. In contrast, when censorship is moderately expensive, there exi...
-
作者：Li, Fei; Zhou, Jidong
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; Yale University
摘要：We propose a model of how multiple societies respond to a common crisis. A government faces a damned-either-way policymaking dilemma: aggressive intervention contains the crisis, but the resulting good outcome makes people skeptical about the costly response; light intervention worsens the crisis and causes the government to be faulted for not doing enough. When multiple societies encounter the crisis sequentially, due to this policymaking dilemma, late societies may underperform despite havi...
