Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fosgerau, Mogens; Sethi, Rajiv; Weibull, Jorgen
• 署名单位: University of Copenhagen; Columbia University; The Santa Fe Institute; Stockholm School of Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210391
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 201-242
• 关键词: discrimination theory; INFORMATION; attention

摘要

We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefully to screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria, and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receive different equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium. The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics, which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination.