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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Miller, Alan D.
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We characterize decreasing impatience, a common behavioral phenomenon in intertemporal choice. Discount factors that display decreasing impatience are characterized through a convexity axiom for investments at fixed interest rates. Then we show that they are equivalent to a geometric average of generalized quasi-hyperbolic discount rates. Finally, they emerge through parimutuel preference aggregation of exponential discount factors. (JEL D15, D61, D91)
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作者：Temnyalov, Emil
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney
摘要：When are differential treatment policies-such as preferential treat-ment, affirmative action, and gender equity policies-justified by efficiency concerns? I propose a nonparametric assignment model where a policymaker assigns agents to different treatments or posi-tions to maximize total surplus, based on the agents' characteristics and noisy information about their types. I provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the agents' signal structures, which charac-terize whether surplus maximi...
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作者：Reshef, Oren
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Entry of new firms onto a platform has an ambivalent effect on the incumbent firms operating on the platform: the main tension lies between the negative effects of increased competitive pressure and positive indirect network effects. This paper empirically studies the net effect of these countervailing forces and its dependence on firm quality, using a quasi-exogenous shock on a large online platform. On average, market expansion favors incumbents, though the average effect masks substantial h...
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作者：Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose L.; Sun, Yajie
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tinbergen Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Navarra
摘要：An increase in quality shifts up the distribution of match utilities offered by firms and makes consumers pickier. The number of prod-ucts that consumers inspect does not necessarily increase in qual-ity. Higher search costs may lead to less quality investment, and the equilibrium price may decrease. If the equilibrium is inefficient , it is because of the inadequacy of quality investment. The market level of quality investment is excessive (insufficient) and consumers are too (little) picky f...
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作者：Kolb, Aaron; Pease, Marilyn; Sacks, Daniel W.; Quick, Joshua
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private sig-nal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature's canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in envi-ronments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclo-sure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisc...
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作者：Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Salle, Isabelle
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Bank of Canada; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Ottawa
摘要：We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world mar-kets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilib-ria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：University of Iowa; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We compare behavior of two person teams with individuals in indefinitely repeated prisoner dilemma games with perfect monitoring. Team discussions are used to understand the rationale underlying these choices and how these choices come about. There are three main findings: (i) Teams learned to cooperate faster than individuals, and cooperation was more stable for teams. (ii) Strategies identified from team dialogues differ from those identified by the Strategy Frequency Estimation Method. This...
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作者：Nguyen, Anh; Tan, Teck Yong
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We study bilateral trade with a seller owning multiple units of a good, where each unit is of binary quality. The seller privately knows her type-defined by the number of lemons that she owns- and which units in her endowments are the lemons (within-type adverse selection). We characterize the set of informationally constrained Pareto optimal allocations and show that every such allocation must involve a trade characterized by a threshold lambda*, with types having less (more) than lambda* uni...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume; Julien, Benoit
作者单位：Monash University
摘要：Principals seek to trade with homogeneous agents by posting incen-tive contracts, which direct their search. Search and moral hazard interact in equilibrium. If using transfers to compensate agents fail-ing to contract, the equilibrium allocation is always constrained -wel-fare-optimal in contrast to the one-to-one principal-agent problem. Search frictions thus correct that inefficiency because search requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilat-eral contra...
