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作者：Heifetz, A; Segev, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：The experimental evidence on the endowment effect [Kahneman et al., J. Polit. Economy 98 (1990) 1325-1348] and the self serving bias in negotiations [Babcok and Loewenstein, J. Econ. Perspect. 11 (1997) 1337-1343] suggests that individuals enter a tough state of mind when they have to make a stand vis-a-vis somebody else. In this work we show how a toughness bias in bargaining may indeed be evolutionary viable. When the inherent toughness of the bargainer is observed by the opponent, this oppo...
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作者：O'Neill, B; Samet, D; Wiener, Z; Winter, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Gradual bargaining is represented by an agenda: a family of increasing sets of joint utilities, parameterized by time. A solution for gradual bargaining specifies an agreement at each time. We axiomatize an ordinal solution, i.e., one that is covariant with order-preserving transformations of utility. It can be viewed as the limit of step-by-step bargaining in which the agreement of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash so...
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper introduces a new model of environments with a large number of agents and stochastic characteristics. We consider sequences of finite but increasingly large economies that 'discretize' the continuum. In the limit we obtain a model that is continuum-like in important respects, yet it has a countable set of agents with a finitely additive, 'uniform' distribution. In this model, the law of large numbers is meaningful and holds on all subintervals. This framework provides, among other th...
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作者：Stanford, W
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：In randomly selected large finite normal form games, pure strategy strongly individually rational outcomes (all payoffs exceeding pure strategy minimax payoffs) exist with high probability. As a corollary, pure strategy Nash equilibria also exist with high probability in certain infinitely repeated games. Specifically, the pure strategy Folk Theorem, which can be true in a vacuous sense, has nontrivial substance with probability approaching one as pure strategy sets increase in cardinality, pr...
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作者：Ballester, C
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：In this paper, we show that there are natural limitations in attaining stability in cooperative environments. These limitations are related to the fact that the time required to obtain a stable partition of the players can grow exponentially, even under very simple assumptions on the preferences over partners. These difficulties arise even when players assess potential coalitions based solely on their size. For this purpose, we demonstrate that the core, the Nash stable set and the individuall...
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作者：Archer, A; Feigenbaum, J; Krishnamurthy, A; Sami, R; Shenker, S
作者单位：Yale University; Cornell University
摘要：We investigate multicast cost sharing from both computational and economic perspectives. Recent work in economics leads to the consideration of two mechanisms: marginal cost (MC), which is efficient and strategyproof, and Shapley value (SH), which is budget-balanced and group-strategyproof. Subsequent work in computer science shows that the MC mechanism can be computed with only two modest-sized messages per link of the multicast tree but that computing the SH mechanism for p potential receive...
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作者：Holzman, R; Monderer, D
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Sandroni, A; Smorodinsky, R
作者单位：Northwestern University; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We introduce a new solution concept for short-sighted players engaging in a repeated interaction: a Belief-based equilibrium (BBE). In a BBE, players optimize myopically given their beliefs which are not necessarily correct, but are not contradicted by the data. We show that, if the stage game has a unique correlated equilibrium then the play of a BBE resembles a Nash equilibrium play. However, a BBE may not be a Nash equilibrium. In particular, in a BBE players may play deterministically when...
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作者：Solan, E; Yariv, L
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We consider normal form games in which two players decide on their strategies before the start of play and Player I can purchase noisy information about his opponent's decisions concerning future response policies (i.e., spy on his opponent). We give a full characterization of the set of distributions over the players' payoffs that can be induced by such equilibria, as well as describe their welfare and Pareto properties. In 2 x 2 games we find three equilibrium phenomena: (i) when the game is...
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作者：Yokoo, M; Sakurai, Y; Matsubara, S
作者单位：NTT, Inc
摘要：We examine the effect of false-name bids on combinatorial auction protocols. False-name bids are bids submitted by a single bidder using multiple identifiers such as multiple e-mail addresses. The obtained results are summarized as follows: (1) the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is strategy-proof and Pareto efficient when there exists no false-name bid, is not false-name-proof; (2) there exists no false-name-proof combinatorial auction protocol that satisfies Pareto efficiency; (...
