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作者：Kibris, Ö
作者单位：Sabanci University
摘要：A bargaining rule is ordinally invariant if its solutions are independent of which utility functions are chosen to represent the agents' preferences. For two agents, only dictatorial bargaining rules satisfy this property (Shapley, L., La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, Editions du CNRS (1969) 25 1). For three agents, we construct a normalized subclass of problems through which an infinite variety of such rules can be defined. We then analyze the implications of var...
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作者：Çelen, B; Kariv, S
作者单位：New York University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We explore Bayes-rational sequential decision making in a game with pure information externalities, where each decision maker observes only her predecessor's binary action. Under perfect information the martingale property of the stochastic learning process is used to establish convergence of beliefs and actions. Under imperfect information, in contrast, beliefs and actions cycle forever. However, despite the stochastic instability, over time the private information is ignored and decision mak...
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作者：Stegeman, M; Rhode, P
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the stability of stochastic Darwinian dynamics in quadratic games. Each player's strategy adjusts through mutation and selection shocks, and stability is independent of the rates at which these shocks arrive. Given stability, we characterize the midpoint of the nondegenerate ergodic distribution. In small populations, some equilibria correspond to relative payoff maximization, but others are unanticipated by existing static concepts. In the ...
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作者：Diamantoudi, E; Miyagawa, E; Xue, LC
作者单位：Columbia University; Concordia University - Canada; McGill University
摘要：This paper studies whether a sequence of myopic blockings leads to a stable matching in the roommate problem. We prove that if a stable matching exists and preferences are strict, then for any unstable matching, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic blockings leading to a stable matching. This implies that, starting from any unstable matching, the process of allowing a randomly chosen blocking pair to form converges to a stable matching with probability one. This result generaliz...
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作者：Schummer, J
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing small gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the rel...
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作者：Mutuswami, S; Pérez-Castrillo, D; Wettstein, D
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Essex; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：In this paper, we consider a local public goods environment. The agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. We propose a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The sub-game perfect equilibria of the mechanism generate efficient outcomes. We also show how to adapt the mechanism to network economies where the economic activity takes place via the formation of links. (C...
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作者：Holzman, R; Kfir-Dahav, N; Monderer, D; Tennenholtz, M
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Sigma. The Sigma-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions, in which the buyers choose strategies that involve bidding only on bundles in Sigma, and ...
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作者：Spiegler, R
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：I explore the idea of simplicity as a belief-selection criterion in games. A pair of strategies in finite-automata representation (s(1), s(2)) is a Simple Nash Equilibrium (SINE) if: (1) s(j) is a best-reply to s(i); (2) every automaton for player j, which generates the same path as s(j) (given s(i)), has at least as many states as s(j). I apply SINE to a bilateral concession game and show that it captures an aspect of bargaining behavior: players employ delay tactics in order to justify their...
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作者：Moldovanu, B
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作者：Board, O
作者单位：Amherst College
摘要：The epistemic program in game theory uses formal models of interactive reasoning to provide foundations for various game-theoretic solution concepts. Much of this work is based around the (static) Aumann structure model of interactive epistemology, but more recently dynamic models of interactive reasoning have been developed, most notably by Stalnaker [Econ. Philos. 12 (1996) 133163] and Battigalli and Siniscalchi [J. Econ. Theory 88 (1999) 188-230], and used to analyze rational play in extens...
