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作者：Cason, TN; Saijo, T; Yamato, T; Yokotani, K
作者单位：University of Osaka; Purdue University System; Purdue University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We conduct a two-stage game experiment with a non-excludable public good. In the first stage, two subjects choose simultaneously whether or not they commit to contributing nothing to provide a pure public good. In the second stage, knowing the other subject's commitment decision, subjects who did not commit in the first stage choose contributions to the public good. We found no support for the evolutionary stable strategy equilibrium, and the ratio of subjects who did not commit to contributin...
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作者：Kirchkamp, O; Moldovanu, B
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim
摘要：We study experiments in an auction setting with interdependent valuation. Groups of three players receive private signals and then bid for a single, indivisible item. Valuations for the item differ within groups and depend asymmetrically on a bidder's own and other bidders' signals. Theoretically, the English auction yields efficient allocations, while other standard auction formats fail to do so. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, we find that an English auction yields significantly mor...
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作者：Kukushkin, NS
作者单位：Federal Research Center Computer Science & Control of RAS; Russian Academy of Sciences; Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre, RAS
摘要：If in a finite strategic game all strategies axe scalar, each player is only affected by the sum of the partners' choices, and one of three single crossing conditions is satisfied, then every best response improvement path leads to a Nash equilibrium. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hernando-Veciana, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：This paper provides some striking results that arise in the unique symmetric equilibrium of common value multi-unit auctions in which some bidders have more information than others. We show that in a generalized second price auction with single-unit demand, bidders with less information do surprisingly well: they can have a greater probability of winning than bidders with mort information do, and may even have a higher expected utility. We also find a positive relationship between the success ...
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作者：Barua, R; Chakravarty, SR; Roy, S; Sarkar, P
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：A sensitivity index quantifies the degree of smoothness with which it responds to fluctuations in the wishes of the members of a voting body. This paper characterizes the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index using a set of independent axioms. Bounds on the index for a very general class of games are also derived. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Burton, A; Sefton, M
作者单位：University of Nottingham
摘要：We report an experiment with a 3 x 3 game with a unique and efficient equilibrium. However, each player's equilibrium strategy may result in a very low payoff if the other player does not use her equilibrium strategy. Players can avoid this possibility by playing an alternative safe strategy. When players have no opportunity for pre-play communication over 80% of subjects choose the safe strategy. However, we observe substantial increases in the amount of equilibrium play when (i) the riskines...
