An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shahriar, Quazi; Wooders, John
• 署名单位: University of Arizona; California State University System; San Diego State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.009
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 558-573
• 关键词: auction; buy price; ebay; laboratory experiments; risk aversion; private values; common values

摘要

eBay's Buy It Now format allows a seller to list an auction with a buy price at which a bidder may purchase the item immediately and end the auction. When bidders are risk averse, then theoretically a buy price can raise seller revenue when values are private (but not when values are common). We report the results of laboratory experiments designed to determine whether in practice a buy price is advantageous to the seller. We find that a suitably chosen buy price yields a substantial increase in seller revenue when values are private, and a small (but statistically insignificant) increase in revenue when values are common. In both cases a buy price reduces the variance of seller revenue. A behavioral model which incorporates the winner's curse and the overweighting by bidders of their own signal explains the common value auction data better than the rational model. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.