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作者：Guarino, Antonio; Harmgart, Heike; Huck, Steffen
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; European Bank of Reconstructon & Development
摘要：We introduce a new model of aggregate information cascades where only one of two possible actions is observable to others. Agents make a binary decision in sequence. The order is random and agents are not aware of their own position in the sequence. When called upon, they are only informed about the total number of others who have chosen the observable action before them. This informational structure arises naturally in many applications. Our most important result is that only one type of casc...
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作者：Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
摘要：We identify and characterize a natural and intuitive class of mechanisms called the k-pivotal mechanisms. The axioms used are efficiency, pairwise strategyproofness, equal treatment of equals and weak linearity. We also identify the subclass of these mechanisms which do not run a budget deficit at all profiles and the mechanism which runs the least budget surplus. We also show that while k-pivotal mechanisms are also weak group strategyproof, strong group strategyproofness and efficiency are i...
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作者：Izmalkov, Sergei; Lepinski, Matt; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); RTX Corporation; Raytheon BBN Technologies; New Economic School
摘要：Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M: in essence, a concrete extensive-form mechanism...
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作者：Jiang, Albert Xin; Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Bhat, Navin A. R.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of Toronto
摘要：Representing and reasoning with games becomes difficult once they involve large numbers of actions and players, because the space requirement for utility functions can grow unmanageably. Action-Graph Games (AGGs) are a fully-expressive game representation that can compactly express utility functions with structure such as context-specific independence, anonymity, and additivity. We show that AGGs can be used to compactly represent all games that are compact when represented as graphical games,...
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作者：Cardona, Daniel; Ponsati, Clara
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat de les Illes Balears; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have instantaneous preferences represented by continuous, concave and single-peaked utility functions, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, and we provide its explicit characterizati...
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作者：Eguia, Jon X.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I study the strategic incentives to coordinate votes in an assembly. Coalitions form voting blocs, acting as single players and affecting the policy outcome. In an assembly with two exogenous parties I show how the incentives to accept party discipline depend on the types of the agents, the sizes of the parties, and the rules the blocs use to aggregate preferences. In a game of fully endogenous party formation, I find sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with one bloc, two blo...
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作者：Lippert, Steffen; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Massey University; University of Auckland; University of Rome Tor Vergata; Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We study networks of relations - groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships - exploring equilibrium conditions under different network configurations and information structures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can flow, and the value of a network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the information and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why network closure is important; wh...
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作者：Schmutzler, Armin
摘要：The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative sta...
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that direction benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that ...
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作者：Anshelevich, Elliot; Shepherd, F. B.; Wilfong, Gordon
作者单位：Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; McGill University; AT&T
摘要：We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex system of business relationships between various Internet entities (e.g., Autonomous Systems, enterprise networks, residential customers). In our model we are given a network topology of nodes and links where the nodes act as the players of the game, and links represent potential contracts. Nodes wish to satisfy their demands, which earn potential revenues, but may have to pay their neighbors for li...
