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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Princeton University; Harvard University
摘要：Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matc...
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Molis, Elena
作者单位：University of Granada; Universidad Publica de Navarra
摘要：There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a fa...
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作者：Charness, Gary; Rustichini, Aldo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study experimentally how males and females differ in the way same-gender peers observing their action affects their social behavior. In our experiment, people play a Prisoner's Dilemma game with a partisan audience watching the choice. Two groups participated in each session; these groups could be both all-male, both all-female, or one all-male and one all-female. Groups were separated into two rooms. Each person in the group played the game once with an audience of the same group and once ...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：In the dynamic game we analyze, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only player to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the network. In every period, each agent strategically chooses whether or not to transmit the items he holds to his neighbors in the network. The sooner all the items are gathered by any individual, the bet...
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作者：Bulo, Samuel Rota; Bomze, Immanuel M.
作者单位：University of Vienna; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia
摘要：Building upon a central paradigm of evolutionary game theory, namely the invasion barrier, we propose the new Infection and Immunization Dynamics (INFIMMDYN), modelling a plausible adaptation process in a large population. For general games, this yields a novel refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept based on dynamical arguments, close in spirit to Nash's original mass action idea in his Ph.D. thesis. For partnership games, INFIMMDYN exhibits a better asymptotic behavior compared to other p...
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作者：Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Southern California
摘要：We investigate a common value bilateral bargaining model with two-sided private information and no aggregate uncertainty. A seller owns an asset whose common valuation is a deterministic function of the two traders' private signals. We first establish a notrade theorem for this environment, and proceed to study the effect of the asset valuation structure and the trading mechanism on extent to which asymmetric information induces individuals to engage in mutually unprofitable exchange. A labora...
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作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：New York University; Brown University
摘要：Framing effects have a significant influence on the finitely repeated matching pennies game. The combination of being labelled a guesser, and having the objective of matching the opponent's action, appears to be advantageous. We find that being a player who aims to match the opponent's action is advantageous irrespective of whether the player moves first or second. We examine alternative explanations for our results and relate them to Edgar Allan Poe's The Purloined Letter. We propose a behavi...
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作者：Moulin, Herve; Laigret, Francois
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：We propose a simple division of the costs of non-rival resources, when a user's need can be met by different subsets of the resources, and no resource is redundant. Our method is characterized by the Stand Alone core property, additivity in costs, and a symmetry requirement. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Young, H. Peyton
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：John Nash's work laid the foundations for evolutionary game theory as well as the theory of games with rational agents. The Nash bargaining solution emerges as a natural solution concept in both of these settings. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
