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作者：Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We consider a non-cooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers in a general situation for which players differ in recognition probability and time preference. We characterize an efficient equilibrium as the generalized Nash bargaining solution that belongs to the core. The model is applied to wage bargaining between an employer and multiple workers. Although involuntary unemployment may occur in equilibrium, full employment emerges as players become sufficiently patient. (C) 2...
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作者：Hellman, Ziv
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Extending to infinite state spaces that are compact metric spaces a result previously attained by D. Samet solely in the context of finite state spaces, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior for several players is given in terms of the players' present beliefs only. A common prior exists if and only if for each random variable it is common knowledge that all Cesaro means of iterated expectations with respect to any permutation converge to the same value; this...
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作者：Bade, Sophie
摘要：The non-existence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter re...
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作者：Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：This paper studies the co-evolution of networks and play in the context of finite population potential games. Action revision, link creation and link destruction are combined in a continuous-time Markov process. I derive the unique invariant distribution of this process in closed Form, as well as the marginal distribution over action profiles and the conditional distribution over networks. It is shown that the equilibrium interaction topology is an inhomogeneous random graph. Furthermore, a ch...
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作者：Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Tauman, Yair
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Reichman University
摘要：We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage. Only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist, while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil. We characterize analytically the p...
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作者：Casella, Alessandra
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The paper studies a committee voting sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. Each member is granted, in addition to a vote for each proposal, a single extra bonus vote - a streamlined version of Storable Votes. When the order of the agenda is exogenous, a sufficient condition guarantees the existence of welfare gains, relative to simple majority voting. But is efficiency compromised if a chair controls the order of the agenda? The agenda becomes cheap talk and can be used to transm...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Rege, Mari
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Universitetet i Stavanger
摘要：Extensive field evidence shows individuals decisions in settings involving uncertainty depend on their peers' decisions. One hypothesized cause of peer group effects is social interaction effects: an individual's utility from an action is enhanced by others taking the same action. We employ a series of controlled laboratory experiments to study the causes of peer effects in choice under uncertainty. We find strong peer group effects in the laboratory. Our design allows us to rule out social le...
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作者：Aggarwal, Gagan; Fiat, Amos; Goldberg, Andrew V.; Hartline, Jason D.; Immorlica, Nicole; Sudan, Madhu
作者单位：Northwestern University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Tel Aviv University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the role of randomization in seller optimal (i.e., profit maximization) auctions. Bayesian optimal auctions (e.g., Myerson, 1981) assume that the valuations of the agents are random draws from a distribution and prior-free optimal auctions either are randomized (e.g.. Goldberg et al., 2006) or assume the valuations are randomized (e.g., Segal, 2003). Is randomization fundamental to profit maximization in auctions? Our main result is a general approach to derandomize single-item multi-...
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作者：Georganas, Sotiris
作者单位：University of London; University of Bonn
摘要：I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior in English auctions. Subjects tend to overbid, when they are certain they can reap the whole surplus ...
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作者：Laurent-Lucchetti, Jeremy; Leroux, Justin
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Bern; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Implementing a project, like a nationwide nuclear waste disposal, which benefits all involved agents but brings major costs only to the host is often problematic. In practice revelation issues and redistributional concerns are significant obstacles to achieving stable agreements. We address these issues by proposing the first mechanism to select It efficient site (the host with the lowest cost) while simultaneously allowing for the in plementation of any individually rational division of the w...
