A strategic analysis of the war against transnational terrorism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carceles-Poveda, Eva; Tauman, Yair
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Reichman University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.06.010
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 49-65
• 关键词: Transnational terrorism; Proactive and defensive measures; strategic interactions; Conflict resolution

摘要

We study a two stage game in which a transnational terrorist organization interacts with an arbitrary number of countries that may differ in their political or economic power, their military effectiveness, the benefit from cooperating against terrorism and the value they assign to damage. Only a subset of countries that emerges endogenously takes proactive measures to fight the terrorist, while all countries incur defensive expenditures to protect their soil. We characterize analytically the pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of the game and show how the equilibrium strategies depend on the key model parameters. We provide an algorithm to find the endogenous set of cooperating countries based on their benefit from cooperation and their political/economic power. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.