Electoral competition with uncertainty averse parties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bade, Sophie
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.001
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 12-29
• 关键词: Uncertainty aversion; multiple priors; median voter; Electoral competition over many issues

摘要

The non-existence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.