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作者：Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Nihon University
摘要：We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process of voluntary participation. We prove that a cooperating group forms as an absorbing state of a Markov perfect equilibrium after a finite number of renegotiations if and only if the group is Pareto effic...
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作者：Nembua, C. Chameni
摘要：Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a more potentially interpretational one. We are focused on an interpretation based on the idea of marginal contribution, a concept already familiar in the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. A genera...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha
作者单位：University of Bern; Maastricht University; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest...
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作者：Non, Arjan
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. The principal can be egoistic or altruistic. Absent worker heterogeneity, an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively weak incentives and a relativel...
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作者：Bednar, Jenna; Chen, Yan; Liu, Tracy Xiao; Page, Scott
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; The Santa Fe Institute; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We present evidence from laboratory experiments of behavioral spillovers and cognitive load that spread across strategic contexts. In the experiments, subjects play two distinct games simultaneously with different opponents. We find that the strategies chosen and the efficiency of outcomes in one game depends on the other game that the subject plays, and that play is altered in predictable directions. We develop a measure of behavioral variation in a normal form game, outcome entropy, and find...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We build on research from neurobiology to model the process through which the brain maps outside evidence into decisions. The sensory system encodes information through cell-firing. Cell-firing is measured against a threshold, and an action is triggered depending on whether the threshold is surpassed. The decision system modulates the threshold. We show that the (constrained) optimal threshold is set in a way that existing beliefs are likely to be confirmed. We then derive behavioral implicati...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We focus on private-value environments. We show that any implementable and neutral social choice function must be a weighted welfare maximizer if the type space of every agent is an m-dimensional open interval, where 111 is the number of alternatives. When the type space of e...
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作者：Bell, Clive; Gersbach, Hans; Schneider, Maik T.
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper investigates how families decide how juveniles use their time. The problem is analyzed in three variations: (i) a 'decentralized' scheme, in which parents control the main budget, but their children dispose of their time as they see fit, together with any earnings from work on their own account: (ii) 'hierarchy', in which parents can enforce, at some cost, particular levels of schooling and supervised work contributing to the main budget; and (iii) the cooperative solution, in which...
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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite de Caen Normandie
摘要：We consider the problem of choosing a partition of a set of objects by a set of agents. The private information of each agent is a strict ordering over the set of partitions of the objects. A social choice function chooses a partition given the reported preferences of the agents. We impose a natural restriction on the allowable set of strict orderings over the set of partitions, which we call an intermediate domain. Our main result is a complete characterization of strategy-proof and tops-only...
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作者：Staudigl, Mathias
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：A recent literature in evolutionary game theory is devoted to the question of robust equilibrium selection under noisy best-response dynamics. In this paper we present a complete picture of equilibrium selection for asymmetric binary choice coordination games in the small noise limit. We achieve this by transforming the stochastic stability analysis into an optimal control problem, which can be solved analytically. This approach allows us to obtain precise and clean equilibrium selection resul...
