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作者：Bracha, Anat; Brown, Donald J.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Boston; Yale University
摘要：Optimism bias is inconsistent with the independence of decision weights and payoffs found in models of choice under risk and uncertainty, such as expected utility theory, subjective expected utility, and prospect theory. We therefore propose an alternative model of risky and uncertain choice where decision weights-affective or perceived risk-are endogenous. Affective decision making (ADM) is a strategic model of choice under risk and uncertainty where we posit two cognitive processes the ratio...
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作者：Friedman, Eric J.
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Halpern, Joseph Y.; Pass, Rafael
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts-most notably Nash equilibrium-predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, that exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the na...
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作者：van Veelen, Matthijs
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：Games that have no evolutionarily stable strategy may very well have neutrally stable ones. (Neutrally stable strategies are also known as weakly evolutionarily stable strategies.) Such neutrally, but not evolutionarily stable strategies can however still be relatively stable or unstable, depending on whether or not the neutral mutants it allows for - which by definition do not have a selective advantage themselves - can open doors for other mutants that do have a selective advantage. This pap...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Sen, Arunava
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of partially honest individuals. A partially honest player is one who has a strict preference for revealing the true state over lying when truthtelling does not lead to a worse outcome than that which obtains when lying. We show that when there are at least three individuals, all social choice correspondences satisfying No Veto Power can be implemented. If all individuals are partially honest and if the domain is separable, then...
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作者：Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：In this paper, we provide three new characterizations of largeness of the core. The first characterization is based on minimal covers of the grand coalition and associated inequalities. The second characterization shows the relation between the bases that provide core elements of the game and the bases that provide core elements of the games that are obtained from the original one by increasing the value of the grand coalition. The third characterization is based on the idea that if a base of ...
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作者：Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca
作者单位：University of Queensland; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：This paper shows how to maximize revenue when a contest is noisy. We consider a case where two or more contestants bid for a prize in a stochastic contest where all bidders value the prize equally. We show that, whenever a Tullock contest yields under-dissipation, the auctioneer's revenue can be increased by optimally fixing the number of tickets. In particular, in a stochastic contest with proportional probabilities, it is possible to obtain (almost) full rent dissipation. We test this hypoth...
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作者：Roy, Sunanda; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas; Iowa State University
摘要：In games with strategic substitutes (GSS), convergence of the best-response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to global stability (convergence of every adaptive dynamic to the same pure strategy Nash equilibrium). Consequently, in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response dynamic. Moreover, in GSS, global stability is equivalent to dominance solvability, showing that in this class of games, two different foundations for robustne...
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作者：Elmaghraby, Wedad J.; Larson, Nathan
作者单位：University of Virginia; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：Bidders often face avoidable fixed costs or other synergies that can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or a preference to avoid volatility, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding difficult in different ways. We find that measures of 'difficulty' provide a consistent expla...
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作者：Hoffmann, Magnus; Rota-Graziosi, Gregoire
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; International Monetary Fund; Universite Clermont Auvergne (UCA)
摘要：We examine simultaneous versus sequential choice of effort in a two-player contest. The timing of moves, determined in a preplay stage prior to the contest subgame, as well as the value of the prize is allowed to be endogenous. Contrary to endogenous timing models with an exogenously fixed prize the present paper finds the following: (1) Players may decide to choose their effort simultaneously in the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the extended game. (2) The SPE does not need to be unique...
