Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maruta, Toshimasa; Okada, Akira
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Nihon University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.006
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 269-284
• 关键词: Group formation; prisoner's dilemma; repeated games; Non-cooperative coalitional bargaining; EFFICIENCY; RENEGOTIATION

摘要

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process of voluntary participation. We prove that a cooperating group forms as an absorbing state of a Markov perfect equilibrium after a finite number of renegotiations if and only if the group is Pareto efficient, provided that individuals are patient. The cooperating group can only expand. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.