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作者：McEvily, Bill; Radzevick, Joseph R.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Toronto; Gettysburg College
摘要：We advance the measurement of trust in economics in two ways. First, we highlight the importance of clearly identifying the target of trust, particularly for obtaining concordance between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust. Second, we introduce a novel behavioral measure of (dis)trust, based on individuals' willingness to pay to avoid being vulnerable to the target of trust. We conduct an experiment in which we vary the target of trust among passersby at several locations around a ci...
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作者：Jadbabaie, Ali; Molavi, Pooya; Sandroni, Alvaro; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Columbia University
摘要：We develop a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks when the information required for learning a parameter may not be at the disposal of any single agent. Individuals engage in communication with their neighbors in order to learn from their experiences. However, instead of incorporating the views of their neighbors in a fully Bayesian manner, agents use a simple updating rule which linearly combines their personal experience and the views of their neighbors. We show that, as lon...
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作者：Daley, Brendan; Schwarz, Michael; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：Duke University; New Economic School
摘要：We analyze an environment in which bidders' private values change over time due to both private investments and exogenous shocks. We demonstrate that a highly-decentralized mechanism achieves efficiency. The mechanism requires a stage of costly public announcements (i.e., signaling) to induce efficient investment. For this reason, an equilibrium selection issue arises, but can be handled by a minor modification in the spirit of virtual implementation. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Abreu, Dilip; Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Princeton University
摘要：We study the Markov perfect equilibria (MPEs) of an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. We establish the existence of MPEs and show that MPE payoffs are not necessarily unique. A method for constructing pure strategy MPEs for high discount factors is developed. For some networks, we find that all MPEs are asymptotically inefficient as players become ...
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作者：Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Ott, Marion
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：We conduct an experiment in continuous time: every subject can change her links to others and her action in a Hawk-Dove game, which she plays bilaterally with each of her linked partners, at any time. We hypothesize that norms exist regarding who establishes and thus pays for links, and that players take these norms into account when deciding on their strategy. For such limitedly forward-looking players who consider others' linking reactions we introduce a strategy adaptation rule (Anticipator...
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作者：Cason, Timothy N.; Sheremeta, Roman M.; Zhang, Jingjing
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Zurich
摘要：Costless pre-play communication has been found to effectively facilitate coordination and enhance efficiency in games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. We report an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly efforts. Allowing intra-group communication leads to more aggressive competition and greater coordination than control treatments without any communication. On the other hand, allowing inter-group communication leads to less destructive competition. A...
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作者：Barmettler, Franziska; Fehr, Ernst; Zehnder, Christian
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Zurich
摘要：Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important economic implications. However, the empirical basis of this research relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case, these experiments would overestimate the importance of soci...
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作者：Mak, Vincent; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Arizona
摘要：We propose an equilibrium model of duopolistic dynamic pricing in which a buyer alternates between two sellers for price offers over a finite time horizon. The game ends when the buyer accepts a price offer or the selling season is over, whichever comes first. Previous research (Granot et al,, 2007) shows that there are successive markdowns in equilibrium when the buyer is commonly known to be myopic; our analysis suggests that when she is known to be strategic price offers over the entire sel...
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作者：van den Brink, Rene
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：In the literature various axiomatizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf value can be found where the only difference is the Shapley value satisfying efficiency and the Banzhaf value satisfying collusion neutrality. Both properties seem to be desirable. In this paper, we show that there is no solution satisfying efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. After that we show that this impossibility is resolved when cooperation among players is restricted by a cycle-free communica...
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作者：Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：Minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems try to connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points in space and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We introduce a new cost sharing solution that always selects a point in the core and that is more responsive to changes than the well-studied folk solution. The paper shows a sufficient condition for the concavity of the stand-alone cost game. Modifying the game to make sure the condition is satisfied and then taki...
