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作者：Dasgupta, Amil; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Toronto; Northwestern University
摘要：We study coordination in dynamic global games with private learning. Players choose whether and when to invest irreversibly in a project whose success depends on its quality and the timing of investment. Players gradually learn about project quality. We identify conditions on temporal incentives under which, in sufficiently long games, players coordinate on investing whenever doing so is not dominated. Roughly speaking, this outcome occurs whenever players' payoffs are sufficiently tolerant of...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Solan, Eilon; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：This paper studies extensive form games with public information where all players have the same information at each point in time. We prove that when there are at least three players, all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained by unmediated cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated games and stochastic games. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hommes, Cars H.; Ochea, Marius I.
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Tilburg University
摘要：This note shows, by means of two simple, three-strategy games, the existence of stable periodic orbits and of multiple, interior steady states in a smooth version of the Best-Response Dynamics, the Logit Dynamics. The main finding is that, unlike Replicator Dynamics, generic Hopf bifurcation and thus, stable limit cycles, occur under the Logit Dynamics, even for three-strategy games. We also show that the Logit Dynamics displays another bifurcation which cannot occur under the Replicator Dynam...
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作者：Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C.
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule imitate-if-better can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a money pump. In particular, imitation is subject to a money pump if and only if the relative payoff function of the game is of the rock-scissors-paper variety. We also show that a sufficient condition for imi...
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作者：Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Mollerstrom, Johanna; Munkhammar, Sara
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics; Harvard University
摘要：In an otherwise neutrally described Prisoners' dilemma experiment, we document that behavior is more likely to be cooperative when the game is called the Community Game than when it is called the Stock Market Game. However, the difference vanishes when only one of the subjects is in control of her action. The social framing effect also vanishes when the game is played sequentially. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that the Community label triggers a desire to cooperate, but ...
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作者：Kumano, Taro; Watabe, Masahiro
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Zirve University
摘要：Most priority-based assignment problems are solved using the deferred acceptance algorithm. Kojima (2010) shows that stability and nonbossiness are incompatible. We show that the deferred acceptance algorithm satisfies a weaker notion of nonbossiness for every substitutable priority structure. We also discuss the multiplicity of dominant strategy equilibria of the preference revelation game induced by the deferred acceptance algorithm. We show that even untruthful dominant strategy equilibria ...
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作者：Dutta, Bhaskar; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：University of Warwick; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be connected to a source, and where the cost matrix describing the cost of connecting each pair of agents is not necessarily symmetric, thus extending the well-studied problem of minimum cost spanning tree games, where the costs are assumed to be symmetric. The focus is on rules which satisfy axioms representing incentive and fairness properties. We show that while some results are similar, there are ...
