Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha
• 署名单位: University of Bern; Maastricht University; Universite de Montreal
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.06.002
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 52-67
• 关键词: Multiple public facilities; Priority rules; Hierarchical rules; Object-population monotonicity; SOVEREIGNTY; strategy-proofness; Generalized median voter rules; No-show paradox

摘要

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We characterize the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, avoid the no-show paradox, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Any such rule can also be viewed as a collection of generalized peak-selection median rules, that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.