Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nembua, C. Chameni
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.07.003
• 发表日期: 2012
• 页码: 431-433
• 关键词: TU-games; Single valued solution; Shapley value; marginal contribution; Null player axiom

摘要

Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a more potentially interpretational one. We are focused on an interpretation based on the idea of marginal contribution, a concept already familiar in the Shapley value and the Solidarity value. A general null player axiom is introduced, and it turns out that any valued solution satisfying the three properties is characterized by a null player model. (C) 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.