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作者：Schmitz, Patrick W.; Troeger, Thomas
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider collective choice from two alternatives. Ex-ante, each agent is uncertain about which alternative she prefers, and may be uncertain about the intensity of her preferences. An environment is given by a probability distribution over utility vectors that is symmetric across agents and neutral across alternatives. In many environments, the majority voting rule maximizes agents' ex-ante expected utilities among all anonymous and dominant-strategy implementable choice rules. But in some ...
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作者：Lopez-Pintado, Dunia
作者单位：Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Some behaviors, ideas or technologies spread and become persistent in society, whereas others vanish. This paper analyzes the role of social influence in determining such distinct collective outcomes. Agents are assumed to acquire information from others through a certain sampling process, that generates an influence network, and they use simple rules to decide whether to adopt or not depending on the behavior of the observed sample. We characterize, as a function of the primitives of the mode...
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作者：Lebrun, Bernard
作者单位：York University - Canada
摘要：In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zheng's (2002), implementation of Myerson's (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models. it is achieved through the English auction. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Mengel, Friederike
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for...
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作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Most existing decision-making models assume that choice behavior is based on preference maximization even when the preferences are incomplete. In this paper we study an alternative approach - justifiable choice: each agent has several preference relations (justifications), and she can use each justification in every choice problem. We present a new behavioral property that requires an alternative to be chosen if it is not inferior to all mixtures of chosen alternatives, and show that this prop...
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作者：Hummel, Patrick
作者单位：Yahoo! Inc
摘要：This paper introduces a model of electoral competition in which candidates select policies and voters are then exposed to arguments in favor of the policies. Voters update their beliefs about their own private preferences after listening to arguments and then vote in the election. I show that candidates adopt more divergent policies when voters are exposed to more arguments before the election. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hernandez, Penelope; Urbano, Amparo; Vila, Jose E.
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia
摘要：This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a universal grammar in a class of common interest Sender-Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Sender's signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiver's strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Sender's signaling strategy is a N...
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作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Zahran, Zaki
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Most legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to pass a proposal, so why don't legislative outcomes favor only a bare majority? We show that compromise can be achieved if legislators are neither too impatient nor too patient, and initial allocations are not too unequal. The compromise is only sustainable if, starting from the unequal allocations there is a possibility of spiraling towards a complete absence of compromise. We find that the range of discount factors for which t...
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作者：Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick
作者单位：Deakin University; Monash University
摘要：We use a laboratory experiment to study bargaining with random implementation. We modify the standard Nash demand game so that incompatible demands do not necessarily lead to the disagreement outcome. Rather, with exogenous probability q, one bargainer receives his/her demand, with the other getting the remainder. We use an asymmetric bargaining set (favouring one bargainer) and disagreement payoffs of zero, and we vary q over several values. Our results mostly support game theory's directiona...
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作者：Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco; Bigoni, Maria
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Bologna
摘要：We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner's dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss altern...
