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作者：Boncinelli, Leonardo; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Pisa; University of Siena
摘要：The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of contribution to local public goods. It generally has a wide multiplicity of equilibria that we refine through stochastic stability. We show that, depending on how we define perturbations - i.e., possible mistakes that agents make - we can obtain very different sets of stochastically stable states. In particular and non-trivially, if we assume that the only possible source of error is that of a contributing agent th...
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作者：Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Roemer, John E.
作者单位：Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Universite Catholique Louvain; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：Resource egalitarianism and welfare egalitarianism are two focal conceptions of distributive justice. We show in this paper that they share a solid common ground. To do so, we analyze a simple model of resource allocation in which agents' abilities (to transform the resource into an interpersonally comparable outcome) and starting points may differ. Both conceptions of egalitarianism are naturally modeled in this context as two allocation rules. The two rules are jointly characterized by the c...
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作者：Troyan, Peter
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Recent work has highlighted welfare gains from the use of the Boston mechanism over deferred acceptance (DA) in school choice problems, in particular finding that when cardinal utility is taken into account, Boston interim Pareto dominates DA in certain incomplete information environments with no school priorities. We show that these previous interim results are not robust to the introduction of (weak) priorities. However, we partially restore the earlier results by showing that from an ex-ant...
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作者：Laclau, Marie
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：I consider repeated games on a network where players interact and communicate with their neighbors. At each stage, players choose actions and exchange private messages with their neighbors. The payoff of a player depends only on his own action and on the actions of his neighbors. At the end of each stage, a player is only informed of his payoff and of the messages he received from his neighbors. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. The main result is to establish a nec...
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作者：Lelarge, Marc
摘要：The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination game with binary choice and give a condition for a new action to become widespread in a random network. We also analyze the possible equilibria of this game and identify conditions for the coexistence of both strategies in large connected sets. Finally we l...
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作者：Noe, Thomas H.; Rebello, Michael; Wang, Jun
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run. Deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good, auction structure, the agents' learning model, and the number of bidders. Although indi...
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作者：Yang, Yi-You
作者单位：Aletheia University
摘要：Sengupta and Sengupta (1996) study the accessibility of the core of a TU game and show that the core, if non-empty, can be reached from any non-core allocation via a finite sequence of successive blocks. This paper complements the result by showing that when the core is empty, a number of non-empty core-extensions, including the least core and the weak least core (Maschler et al., 1979), the positive core (Orshan and Sudholter, 2001) and the extended core (Bejan and Gomez, 2009), are accessibl...
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作者：Benchekroun, Hassan; Withagen, Cees
作者单位：McGill University; Universite de Montreal; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
摘要：We consider a nonrenewable resource game with one cartel and a set of fringe members. We show that (i) the outcomes of the closed-loop and the open-loop nonrenewable resource game with the fringe members as price takers (the cartel-fringe game a la Salant, 1976) coincide and (ii) when the number of fringe firms becomes arbitrarily large, the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop Nash game does not coincide with the equilibrium outcome of the closed-loop cartel-fringe game. Thus, the outcome o...
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作者：Koenig, Michael D.; Battiston, Stefano; Napoletano, Mauro; Schweitzer, Frank
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School
摘要：We investigate the efficiency and stability of R&D networks in a model with network-dependent indirect spillovers. We show that the efficient network structure critically depends on the marginal cost of R&D collaborations. When the marginal cost is low, the complete graph is efficient, while high marginal costs imply that the efficient network is asymmetric and has a nested structure. Regarding the stability of network structures, we show the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibr...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：I study the ex-ante efficient allocation of a set of quality-heterogeneous objects to a number of heterogeneous risk-neutral agents. Agents have independent private values, which represent the maximum cost they are willing to sustain to obtain an object of unitary quality. The designer faces a trade-off between allocative efficiency and cost of screening, because the cost sustained is wasted. The optimal mechanism ranks agents based on their marginal contribution to social surplus and distribu...
