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作者：Colombo, Stefano
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：This comment points out the existence of flaws in the proof of the main proposition proposed by Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) [Fauli-Oller, R., Sandonis, J., 2002: Welfare reducing licensing. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 192-205] and corrects them. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Perez-Castrillo, David; Querou, Nicolas
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite de Montpellier
摘要：We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is smoother in the sense that small variations in an agent's bids do not lead to dramatic changes in the probability of selecting a project. This mechanism is shown to possess several interesting properties. First, the equilibrium outcome is unique. Second, it ensures an...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper investigates the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an ascending-price core-selecting auction, which is recently used in some countries' spectrum license auctions. We suppose that there are two identical items, two small bidders, and one large bidder. The small bidders demand only one unit of the item, whereas the large bidder wants both units. Package bidding ensures that the large bidder faces no exposure problem and behaves truthfully. However, one of the small bidders stops bidding...
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作者：Breitmoser, Yves
摘要：This paper analyzes strategic choice in p-beauty contests. First, I show that it is not generally a best reply to guess the expected target value, even in games with n > 2 players, and that iterated best response strictly applied does not induce a choice sequence approximating p(k) . 0.5. Second, I argue that the beliefs and actions of players typically considered to be level 2-4 are intuitively captured also by high-level concepts such as quantal response equilibrium and noisy introspection. ...
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作者：Nieken, Petra; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Dobzinski, Shahar; Lavi, Ron; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Cornell University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We study multi-unit auctions for bidders that have a budget constraint, a situation very common in practice that has received relatively little attention in the auction theory literature. Our main result is an impossibility: there is no deterministic auction that (1) is individually rational and dominant-strategy incentive-compatible, (2) makes no positive transfers, and (3) always produces a Pareto optimal outcome. In contrast, we show that Ausubel's clinching auction satisfies all these prop...
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作者：Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Lehigh University
摘要：We report findings from experiments on two delegation-communication games. An uninformed principal chooses whether to fully delegate her decision-making authority to an informed agent or to retain the authority and communicate with the agent via cheap talk to obtain decision-relevant information. In the game in which the delegation outcome is payoff-dominated by both the truthful and the babbling communication outcomes, we find that principal-subjects almost always retain their authority and a...
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作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Universite Paris Cite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of East Anglia
摘要：Economic models describe individuals by underlying characteristics, such as the degree to which they like music, have sympathy, want success, need recognition, etc. In reality, such characteristics change through experiences: taste for Mozart changes through attending concerts, sympathy through meeting people, etc. Models typically ignore change, partly because it is unclear how to incorporate it. I develop a general axiomatic framework for defining, analysing and comparing rival models of cha...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：This paper takes the idea of coalitional behavior - groups of people occasionally acting together to their mutual benefit - and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An equilibrium selection criterion is defined which we call coalitional stochastic stability (CSS). This differs from existing work on stochastic stability in that profitable coalitional deviations are given greater importance than unprofitable single player d...
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作者：Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz
作者单位：Utrecht University; Radboud University Nijmegen
摘要：This paper experimentally analyzes the effect of network structures on individuals' decisions in a game of strategic substitutes. The theoretical basis for our experiment is the model of Bramoulle and Kranton (2007). As predicted, we find that individuals are able to coordinate on equilibria, but that coordination strongly depends on the network structure. Despite frequent coordination failures, in graphs of size N = 4 equilibrium play seems easier on network architectures with high (low) dens...
