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作者：Oyarzun, Carlos; Sarin, Rajiv
作者单位：University of Birmingham; University of Queensland
摘要：Decision makers are often described as seeking higher expected payoffs and avoiding higher variance in payoffs. We provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions for learning rules, that assume the agent has little prior and feedback information about the environment, to reflect such preferences. We adopt the framework of Borgers, Morales and Sarin (2004, Econometrica) who provide similar results for learning rules that seek higher expected payoffs. Our analysis reveals that a concern f...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Ravi, R.; Sayedi, Amin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：In a setup where a divisible good is to be allocated to a set of bidders with budget constraints, we introduce a mechanism in the spirit of the Vickrey auction. In the mechanism we propose, understating budgets or values is weakly dominated. Since the revenue is increasing in budgets and values, all kinds of equilibrium deviations from true valuations turn out to be beneficial to the auctioneer. We also show that ex-post Nash equilibrium of our mechanism is near Pareto optimal in the sense tha...
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作者：Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering. We develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers, who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation in the auction. We first demonstrate that the optimal mal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price. We then show that standard auctions with a rese...
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作者：Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Cyprus
摘要：This paper characterizes a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections with a continuous policy space, where candidates are office motivated and one candidate enjoys a non-policy advantage over the other candidate. We show that if voters' utility functions are concave and the median voter ideal point is drawn from a unimodal distribution, there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium where the advantaged candidate chooses the ideal point o...
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作者：Milchtaich, Igal
作者单位：Bar Ilan University
摘要：The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other players' payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyone's actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As it turns out, even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups. In particular, a concern for others' pa...
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作者：Marden, Jason R.; Shamma, Jeff S.
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Log-linear learning is a learning algorithm that provides guarantees on the percentage of time that the action profile will be at a potential maximizer in potential games. The traditional analysis of log-linear learning focuses on explicitly computing the stationary distribution and hence requires a highly structured environment. Since the appeal of log-linear learning is not solely the explicit form of the stationary distribution, we seek to address to what degree one can relax the structural...
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作者：Dominiak, Adam; Duersch, Peter; Lefort, Jean-Philippe
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin behaviorally the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsberg's 3-color experiment. We find that more subjects act in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency and that this result is even stronger among ambiguity averse subjects. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All...
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作者：Spiliopoulos, Leonidas
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper aspires to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature regarding learning in games the absence of empirical verification of learning rules involving pattern recognition. Weighted fictitious play is extended to detect two-period patterns in opponents' behavior and to comply with the cognitive laws of subjective perception. An analysis of the data from Nyarko and Schotter (2002) uncovers significant evidence of pattern recognition in elicited beliefs and action choices. The probability t...
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作者：Zhao, Rui R.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY
摘要：Renegotiation and conflict resolution are studied in relational contracting under subjective evaluation. Renegotiation has three effects. First, it makes the incentive pay scheme low powered: the maximum variation of compensation across performance levels is compressed and the contract is less extreme compared to the case without renegotiation. This effect is stronger when the players are less patient. Second, renegotiation typically renders termination impossible; the contract relies on a low...
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作者：Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Copenhagen; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Maastricht University
摘要：We present a striking example of the deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly. In line with previous experiments we show in a one-shot setting that the allegedly robust false consensus effect disappears if representative information is readily available. But the effect reappears if a small cognitive effort is required to retrieve the information. Most subjects apparently ignore valuable information if it is not handed to them on a silver platter. We conclude that the relevance of the fa...
