-
作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one's initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high...
-
作者：Nermuth, Manfred; Pasini, Giacomo; Pin, Paolo; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Vienna; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Tilburg University; University of Siena; University of Essex
摘要：We propose a model of price competition where consumers exogenously differ in the number of prices they compare. Our model can be interpreted either as a non-sequential search model or as a network model of price competition. We show that (i) if consumers who previously just sampled one firm start to compare more prices all types of consumers will expect to pay a lower price and (ii) if consumers who already sampled more than one price sample (even) more prices then there exists a threshold - ...
-
作者：Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of payment are considered: (i) charging the winning buyer a one-time payment: (ii) charging an initial payment followed by a profit sharing contract (PSC) that divides the realized profit between the seller and the winning buyer. A symmetric interdependent values model with a risk neutral seller and either risk averse or risk neutral buyers is considered, along with the second pric...
-
作者：Kadan, Ohad; Swinkels, Jeroen M.
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Saint Louis University; Northwestern University
摘要：Consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m. This paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent. We present sufficient conditions on the informativeness of the signal observed by the principal and on the agent's utility under which when m increases, induced effort (and hence productivity) falls. We also study how the cost minimizing contract for any given effort level var...
-
作者：Mueller, Wieland; Tan, Fangfang
作者单位：University of Vienna; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Max Planck Society
摘要：Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of intergroup versus interindividual decision-making by running both one-shot and repeated sessions of a simple two-player sequential market game (Stackelberg duopoly). Whereas in one-shot markets we find no significant differences in the behavior of groups and individuals, in repeated markets we fin...
-
作者：Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidder's shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is denoted by k is an element of [0, 1]. We partially characterize equilibrium strategies and show that they are closely related to equilibrium strategies of two well-studied mechanisms: the double auction...
-
作者：Aflaki, Sam
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty, where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource. Each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource, but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable level then the resource deteriorates and all players are worse-off. We consider the effect of uncertainty about the sustainable resource size on the outcome of this game. Assuming a general dynamic for r...
-
作者：Bresky, Michal
作者单位：Charles University Prague
摘要：This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is, the higher is the seller's revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the...
-
作者：Pape, Andreas Duus; Kurtz, Kenneth J.
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Binghamton University, SUNY
摘要：We introduce a computer program which calculates an agent's optimal behavior according to case-based decision theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1995) and use it to test CBDT against a benchmark set of problems from the psychological literature on human classification learning (Shepard et al., 1961). This allows us to evaluate the efficacy of CBDT as an account of human decision-making on this set of problems. We find: (1) The choice behavior of this program (and therefore case-based decision theo...
-
作者：McDonald, Ian M.; Nikiforakis, Nikos; Olekalns, Nilss; Sibly, Hugh
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Max Planck Society; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Tasmania
摘要：We experimentally investigate reference group formation and the impact of social comparisons in a three-player ultimatum game. The players compete in a real-effort task for the role of the proposer. The role of the responder is randomly allocated to one of the other two participants. The third participant, the non-responder, receives a fixed payment our treatment variable - and makes no decision. Knowing the size of this payment, the proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-offer to the responder. Mo...
