Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mueller, Wieland; Tan, Fangfang
• 署名单位: University of Vienna; Tilburg University; Tilburg University; Max Planck Society
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.09.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 658-674
• 关键词: Stackelberg market; Groups versus individuals; Discontinuity effect; experiment

摘要

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of intergroup versus interindividual decision-making by running both one-shot and repeated sessions of a simple two-player sequential market game (Stackelberg duopoly). Whereas in one-shot markets we find no significant differences in the behavior of groups and individuals, in repeated markets we find that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of individuals. To a large extent, this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices (sequential or strategy method), the matching protocol (random- or fixed-matching), and the econometric method used to account for observed first- and second-mover behavior. We discuss various possible explanations for the differential effect that the time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individual and group players' (non)conformity with subgame perfectness. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.