Strategic information exchange

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas
• 署名单位: Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 444-467
• 关键词: Repeated games; Incomplete information on both sides; information externalities; folk theorem; equilibrium

摘要

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one's initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.