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作者：Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived, and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which (A) there is a single financial transaction (with the buyer), (B) ex-post participation constraints are fulfilled, (C) there is no positive transfer to any agent and (D) payments are dete...
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作者：Thomson, William
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：We consider the problem of adjudicating conflicting claims, and characterize the family of rules satisfying four standard invariance requirements, homogeneity, two composition properties, and consistency. It takes as point of departure the characterization of the family of two-claimant rules satisfying the first three requirements, and describes the restrictions imposed by consistency on this family and the further implications of this requirement for problems with three or more claimants. The...
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作者：Kleinberg, Jon; Ligett, Katrina
作者单位：Cornell University; California Institute of Technology; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We present a new model for reasoning about the way information is shared among friends in a social network and the resulting ways in which the social network fragments. Our model formalizes the intuition that revealing personal information in social settings involves a trade-off between the benefits of sharing information with friends, and the risks that additional gossiping will propagate it to someone with whom one is not on friendly terms but who is within one's community. We study the beha...
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作者：McGee, Peter
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：Auctions are often used to sell idiosyncratic goods difficult for potential bidders to value ex ante. Laboratory auctions with uncertainty over final values in this experiment resulted in 18% and 27% of bids above the expected value of the item in private-value first-price and English auctions, respectively. Risk-seeking preferences as measured on an individual decision task cannot explain overbidding and the first-price auction results suggest that risk aversion may not be a good explanation ...
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作者：Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Max Planck Society
摘要：The generic alliance game considers players in an alliance who fight against an external enemy. After victory, the alliance may break up, and its members may fight against each other over the spoils of the victory. Our experimental analysis of this game shows: In-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. Former 'brothers in arms' fight even more vigorously against each other than strangers do. Furthermore, this vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces the abili...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Brandt, Felix; Harrenstein, Paul
作者单位：Australian National University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Technical University of Munich; University of Oxford
摘要：A minimal requirement on allocative efficiency in the social sciences is Pareto optimality. In this paper, we identify a close structural connection between Pareto optimality and perfection that has various algorithmic consequences for coalition formation. Based on this insight, we formulate the Preference Refinement Algorithm (PM) which computes an individually rational and Pareto optimal outcome in hedonic coalition formation games. Our approach also leads to various results for specific cla...
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作者：Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The election of extreme political leaders is often associated with changes in political institutions. This paper studies these phenomena through a model in which the median voter elects a leader anticipating that he will impose institutional constraints-such as constitutional amendments, judicial appointments, or the implicit threat of a coup-that influence the behavior of future political challengers. It is typically optimal for the median voter to elect an extreme incumbent when democracy is...
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作者：Arcaute, E.; Dyagilev, K.; Johari, R.; Mannor, S.
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：Network formation games capture two conflicting objectives of selfish nodes in a network: such nodes wish to form a well-connected network and, at the same time, to minimize their cost of participation. We consider three families of such models where nodes avoid forming edges beyond those necessary for connectivity, thus forming tree networks. We focus on two local two-stage best-response dynamics in these models, where nodes can only form links with others in a restricted neighborhood. Despit...
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作者：Dogan, Gonul; van Assen, Marcel; Potters, Jan
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：We examine experimentally how link costs affect the formation of links between a single seller and two potential buyers as well as the ensuing bargaining. Theory predicts that link costs lead to less competitive networks, with one link rather than two links, and that link costs do not affect the bargaining outcomes conditional on the network. We find support for the first but not the second prediction. 2-link networks form less frequently when there are link costs. Given that a 2-link network ...
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作者：Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Schumacher, Heiner
作者单位：University of Rochester; Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Many markets without repeated seller buyer relations feature third-party monitors that sell recommendations. We analyze the profit-maximizing recommendation policies of such monitors. In an infinitely repeated game with seller moral hazard and short-lived consumers, a monopolistic monitor with superior information about the seller's past effort decisions sells recommendations about the seller to consumers. We show that the monitor has an incentive to make its recommendations hard to predict, w...
