Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bresky, Michal
• 署名单位: Charles University Prague
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 205-217
• 关键词: Multi-unit auction; Multiple-object auction; market efficiency; Optimal selling mechanism; Discriminatory and uniform-price auction; with reservation price

摘要

This paper analyzes efficiency in a uniform-price multi-unit auction with a positive reservation price. I demonstrate that the reservation price is an important policy tool that may increase efficiency (or welfare) in multi-unit uniform-price auctions. I show that the higher the reservation price is, the higher is the seller's revenue and the higher is the efficiency of a final allocation of units that could be attained in a multi-unit uniform-price auction. The reservation price increases the bidder's equilibrium strategy in a specific way that is inherent to the uniform-price auction. Thus the reservation price effect on efficiency is in contrast to other auction formats; e.g., the reservation price decreases efficiency in the Vickrey auction and single-unit auctions with symmetric bidders. Therefore the main result can be added to the list of results from mechanism design and auction theory that fail to extend the single-unit/single-dimensional context to the multi-unit/multi-dimensional one. (C) 2013 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.