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作者：Lang, Matthias; Wambach, Achim
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Cologne
摘要：Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy. The credible announcement of thoroughly auditing claim reports is a powerful deterrent. Yet, we show that uncertainty about fraud detection can be an effective strategy to deter ambiguity-averse agents from reporting false insurance claims. If, in addit...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Querou, Nicolas
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Universite de Montpellier; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS)
摘要：We analyze the problem of optimal monopoly pricing in social networks where agents care about consumption or prices of their neighbors. We characterize the relation between optimal prices and consumers' centrality in the social network. This relation depends on the market structure (monopoly vs. oligopoly) and on the type of externalities (consumption versus price). We identify two situations where the monopolist does not discriminate across nodes in the network (linear monopoly with consumpti...
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作者：Piccolo, Salvatore; Pagnozzi, Marco
作者单位：Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：When do principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing affects contracting within competing organizations and induces agents' strategies to be correlated through the distortions imposed by principals to obtain information. We show that the incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities between principals and the correlation of agents' information. With small externalities, principals sh...
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作者：Maximiano, Sandra; Sloof, Randolph; Sonnemans, Joep
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Numerous gift-exchange experiments have found a positive wage-effort relationship. In (almost) all these experiments the employer both owns and controls the firm. This paper explores to what extent the separation of ownership and control affects the wage-effort relationship. We compare the standard bilateral gift-exchange game between an owner-manager and a worker with two trilateral ones where the firm is owned by a shareholder and controlled by a manager. The wage-effort relationship is simi...
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作者：Meng, Dawen; Tian, Guoqiang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：This paper provides a new explanation for the dominance of the low-powered incentive contract over the high-powered incentive contract using a hybrid model of moral hazard and adverse selection. We first show that unobservable risk aversion or cost leads to low-powered incentives. We then consider the case where both risk aversion and cost of the agent are unobservable to the principal. This multidimensional mechanism design problem is solved under two assumptions with regard to the structures...
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作者：Rosenberg, Dinah; Salomon, Antoine; Vieille, Nicolas
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Universite Paris 13
摘要：We study a class of symmetric strategic experimentation games. Each of two players faces an (exponential) two-armed bandit problem, and must decide when to stop experimenting with the risky arm. The equilibrium amount of experimentation depends on the degree to which experimentation outcomes are observed, and on the correlation between the two individual bandit problems. When experimentation outcomes are public, the game is basically one of strategic complementarities. When experimentation dec...
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作者：Hu, Yingyao; Kayaba, Yutaka; Shum, Matthew
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjects' belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjects' eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjects' beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to update down following unsuccessful choices, than update up following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision...
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作者：Spiliopoulos, Leonidas
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based categorization-using either an exemplar or a prototype approach. Empirical estimation is performed on the elicited-belief data from two experiments (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Rutstrom and Wilcox, 2009) using repeated ...
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作者：Mandler, Michael
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：We consider the optimization problem of a campaign trying to win an election when facing aggregate uncertainty, where agents' voting probabilities are uncertain. Even a small amount of uncertainty will in a large electorate eliminate many of counterintuitive results that arise when voting probabilities are known. In particular, a campaign that can affect the voting probabilities of a fraction of the electorate should maximize the expected difference between its candidate's and the opposing can...
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作者：Hu, Youxin; Kagel, John; Xu, Xiaoshu; Ye, Lixin
作者单位：Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We investigate a private value auction in which a single entrant on winning imposes a negative externality on two regular bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, regular bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding compared to the English auction. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions...
