Auctions with a profit sharing contract

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.007
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 247-270
• 关键词: Selling a resource; auction; Profit sharing contracts; principal-agent relationship

摘要

An auction is used to sell a resource that is then developed by the winning buyer to generate a profit. Two forms of payment are considered: (i) charging the winning buyer a one-time payment: (ii) charging an initial payment followed by a profit sharing contract (PSC) that divides the realized profit between the seller and the winning buyer. A symmetric interdependent values model with a risk neutral seller and either risk averse or risk neutral buyers is considered, along with the second price and English auctions. The properties of those PSCs in which either positive profits or both profits and losses are split according to a fixed fraction are studied. The seller's expected revenue is shown to be larger in a class of general PSCs with nontrivial profit sharing than in an auction with only a one-time payment. (c) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.