Bilateral k + 1-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wasser, Cedric
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.014
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 350-368
• 关键词: Asymmetric auctions; Double auction; First-price auction; Partnership dissolution; Detail-free mechanism

摘要

We study a sealed-bid auction between two bidders with asymmetric independent private values. The two bidders own asymmetric shares in a partnership. The higher bidder buys the lower bidder's shares at a per-unit price that is a convex combination of the two bids. The weight of the lower bid is denoted by k is an element of [0, 1]. We partially characterize equilibrium strategies and show that they are closely related to equilibrium strategies of two well-studied mechanisms: the double auction between a buyer and a seller and the first-price auction between two buyers (or two sellers). Combining results from those two branches of the literature enables us to prove equilibrium existence. Moreover, we find that there is a continuum of equilibria if k is an element of (0, 1) whereas the equilibrium is unique if k is an element of {0,1}. Our approach also suggests a procedure for numerical simulations. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.