Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laclau, M.
• 署名单位: Paris School of Economics; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.009
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 136-160
• 关键词: communication; folk theorem; Imperfect private monitoring; networks; repeated games

摘要

I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player's payoff depends on his own and his neighbors' actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not the actions of his neighbors. Players can communicate costlessly at each stage: communication can be public, private or a mixture of both. Payoffs are assumed to be sensitive to unilateral deviations. First, for any network, a folk theorem holds if some Joint Pairwise Identifiability condition regarding payoff functions is satisfied. Second, a necessary and sufficient condition on the network topology for a folk theorem to hold for all payoff functions is that no two players have the same set of neighbors not counting each other. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.