The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Masuda, Takehito; Okano, Yoshitaka; Saijo, Tatsuyoshi
• 署名单位: Kochi University Technology; University of Osaka; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 73-85
• 关键词: Public good experiment; Approval mechanism; Multiple implementation

摘要

We propose the minimum approval mechanism (MAM) for a standard linear public good environment with two players. Players simultaneously and privately choose their contributions to the public good in the first stage. In the second stage, they simultaneously decide whether to approve the other's choice. Both contribute what they choose in the first stage if both players approve; otherwise, both contribute the minimum of the two choices in the first stage. The MAM implements the Pareto-efficient allocation in multiple solution concepts including backward elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS), limit logit agent quantal response equilibrium, subgame perfect minimax regret equilibrium, level-k thinking, and diagonalization heuristics. Moreover, the MAM is unique under plausible conditions. Overall, contributions in the MAM experiment averaged 94.9%. Quantifying subjects' responses to the questionnaire reveal heterogeneous reasoning processes and highlight the importance of developing mechanisms that implement the desired social choice outcome in multiple solution concepts. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.