A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adachi, Tsuyoshi
• 署名单位: Waseda University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.07.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 508-518
• 关键词: Implementation theory; backward induction; Subgame perfect equilibrium

摘要

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants whose socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors who may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show a natural mechanism that is finite and complete informational, with no simultaneous moves (i.e., it is solvable by backward induction), which implements the socially optimal ranking with subgame perfect equilibria. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.